Fee strips on Robinhood Chain. Sell the fixed. Keep the upside.
Fee strips on Robinhood Chain
Vellum splits a pool's future fee accrual into two tradeable legs, minted together from one deposit and settled at a fixed maturity. No oracle, no borrower, no governance token.
Every revenue-generating protocol holds an asset it cannot trade: its own future fee stream. A DEX knows it will earn roughly X in swap fees over the next 30 days, but it cannot sell that claim today to raise capital, smooth treasury, or lock in a fixed yield. It must wait.
Today the only approximations are veToken fee-sharing (the fee claim wrapped in a governance token, polluted by vote markets and emissions), real-yield vaults (baskets, not a split) and borrowing against future revenue (off-chain, bespoke, opaque, requires a lender).
What does not exist: a way to sell a verifiable future fee claim at a discount to a fixed-income buyer, while selling the upside on that fee stream to a speculator, with both sides priced by an open market. That is the primitive.
Trailing fee APR sets the projection P. The fixed claim F is haircut below P so the bond is likely covered. Drag realized fees to see the waterfall: RB first, up to F; UT takes what is left.
The calculator opens from the Example tile. Up / Flat / Down keep the PRD ratios to F (2,000 / 1,200 / 800 for F = 1,200). RB is capped at F but senior; UT is uncapped but junior and can be zero. Returns ignore the 0.3% mint, redeem and AMM fees. The PRD worked example (F = 1,200 on P = 1,644) used a 73% haircut; the contract fixes F at 70% of P, which is the default here.
A depositor (an LP or a protocol) locks a fee-accruing full-range Uniswap v4 position for a fixed tenor of 30 days.
The contract projects fee accrual P over the tenor from trailing on-chain fee growth and sets a fixed claim F = 70% of P.
Depositor mints RB (face value F) and UT (residual above F). The 0.3% mint fee is taken in kind: 0.3% of the RB and UT supply goes to the treasury, never the LP principal.
Sell whichever leg you do not want. Treasury sells UT, keeps RB. Speculator buys UT, ignores RB. Each leg trades against USDG.
At maturity, anyone settles. RB holders receive up to F; UT holders receive the remainder; if fees fall short, RB is impaired pro-rata and UT receives zero.
RB and UT are claims on fees, not on the underlying LP principal. The position principal returns to the depositor, never to RB/UT holders. Worst case is fees = 0, RB worth 0, but the depositor always gets their principal back.
Realized-fee-only settlement; 30d tenor raises cost
Live, unsolved
F haircut at 70% of projection; seniority; bounded (fees-only)
Mitigated
Seed both pools from the project; single-pool focus
Planned
v1 restricts to full-range positions
Mitigated by scope
RB is a claim on realized fees, not a promise to pay; but this is unresolved and must go to counsel before mainnet
Open, do not fake a solution
Principal always returns to depositor; settlement is permissionless
Mitigated
| Risk | Severity | Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Volume wash to inflate UT | High | Realized-fee-only settlement; 30d tenor raises cost | Live, unsolved |
| Fees fall below F, RB impaired | Medium | F haircut at 70% of projection; seniority; bounded (fees-only) | Mitigated |
| No liquidity at launch | High | Seed both pools from the project; single-pool focus | Planned |
| LP position out of range | Low | v1 restricts to full-range positions | Mitigated by scope |
| Regulatory/tax treatment of RB as a debt security | Medium | RB is a claim on realized fees, not a promise to pay; but this is unresolved and must go to counsel before mainnet | Open, do not fake a solution |
| Depositor never redeems (no loss) | Low | Principal always returns to depositor; settlement is permissionless | Mitigated |
The two open items, volume-wash manipulation and the legal treatment of RB, are the honest unknowns. Neither blocks an MVP on testnet; both must be resolved before meaningful TVL. What you see on this site is that MVP: a public testnet sandbox with a simulated fee source and a valueless Test USDG, so the mechanics can be tested and shown before anything touches a real pool. There is no mainnet deployment and no Vellum token.
Pull trailing 30d fee data for the top Robinhood Chain v4 pools; pick the single most-traded one; confirm a full-range position is viable.
Deposit, mint, trade, settle: the full loop on one pool, one tenor.
Live on the chosen pool. Seed liquidity. Target: one market, honest volume, RB discount stability.
Add 7/90/180d tenors, add pools, add protocol fee-switch revenue (requires the first BD partner).
Evaluate a token for LP incentives, then multi-protocol expansion.
No governance token in v1. The product is fee-based: 0.3% of the RB/UT supply on mint (in kind), 0.3% of the USDG proceeds on redeem, 0.3% LP fee in the AMM. A token is justified only later, for liquidity mining of RB/UT pools if organic liquidity fails.
One deposit of a full-range Uniswap v4 LP position creates one series with a 30-day maturity. The vault projects 30-day fees P, sets the fixed claim F = 0.7 · P, and mints two ERC20 strip tokens for that series.